With the outbreak of the financial crisis in mid-1997, the Korean government has removed a majority of M&A-related regulations in order to facilitate M&A transactions. This was based upon the belief that M&As are one of the most efficient ways to restructure financially distressed firms compared to other government-driven restructuring programs. In this paper, we try to empirically assess the role of M&A in restructuring distressed firms in Korea following the financial crisis. In doing so, three empirical analyses have been conducted. The first analysis attempts to identify financial characteristics of the insolvent M&A targets and to compare them with those of solvent M&A targets. The second exercise directly tests the change in performance of insolvent M&A targets before and after such M&A transactions. The third analysis is a more general assessment on the role of M&A transactions to determine if being involved in an M&A transaction (regardless of its motivate) has reduced the probability of becoming insolvent in the future. Overall, we find that the M&A market in Korea remains inefficient when considering the characteristics of M&A targeted firms, however, there exists some evidence of M&A activities having played a significantly positive role in restructuring financially distressed firms in Korea.
I. Introduction
With the outbreak of the financial crisis in mid-1997, reconstructing the insolvent financial and corporate sectors was a top policy priority for the Korean government. Accordingly, various government policies have been implemented thus far. These include the reform of bankruptcy laws for making bankruptcy procedures of the insolvent firms efficient, introduction of government-sponsored voluntary 'workout' programs in which interested creditor groups play a major role in rehabilitating the insolvent firms and establishing asset management companies in order to deal with the restructuring of corporate debt, to just name a few.
Among the various instruments for corporate restructuring, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have received increasing attention in Korea in the aftermath the financial crisis. This was based on the belief that M&As were one of the most efficient ways to restructure financially distressed firms compared to other government-driven restructuring programs. In addition, (both domestic and cross-border) M&As could invite new investment and introduce new managerial, production and marketing resources to acquired firms, thereby improving efficiency and productivity in the long run (Mody and Negishi (2001) ).
In hopes of reaping these beneficial effects from M&A activities, the Korean government has removed a majority of M&A-related regulations over the last half-decade. Cross-border M&As (including green field FDI) initial came into focus just after the financial crisis, because most of the domestic companies were experiencing severe financial difficulties at that time. At the same time, deregulation policies to stimulate M&A activity among domestic firms were implemented as well.
1 Partly due to these government deregulation policies, we have observed a rising trend of M&A activity in Korea.
This paper seeks to empirically assess the effectiveness of M&A activity in Korea as a tool for corporate restructuring after the financial crisis. In particular, we focus on M&A activity involving financially distressed firms and attempt to evaluate the usefulness of M&A activity. In doing so, three empirical exercises will be conducted. The first examines the causes of M&A transactions that targeted financially distressed firms. More specifically, we ask which firms are more likely to be the targets of M&A transactions among financially distressed firms. From this exercise, we can extract a broad picture on the nature of M&A market in regards to corporate restructuring. In the second part of the empirical study, we ask whether the targeted insolvent firms capture real economic gains by directly comparing pre-and post-M&A performances using profitability and efficiency as benchmarks. The third empirical exercise is a more general assessment of the role of M&A transactions, which asks if being the target of an M&A has reduced the probability of becoming financially distressed in the future.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief review of the policy measures implemented by the Korean government in order to stimulate M&A transactions around the financial crisis. Here, we will see a clear change in the government's deregulation policy stance toward M&A activities. In Section III, the two data sets used in this paper will be discussed. The recent M&A trend based on the data used in the paper will be described as well. In Section IV, the empirical methodologies mentioned above and their results will be explained to empirically assess the role of the M&A market for financially distressed firms in Korea after the financial crisis. Section V concludes with some policy recommendations.
II. M&A-Related Policy Changes in Korea
Before the financial crisis in 1997, Korea's M&A market was one of the most inactive and closed among industrialized economies. One of the reasons was that legal restrictions discouraged M&A activity, particularly for foreign firms. For example, foreign firms were generally prohibited from acquiring outstanding shares of a Korean company outside of the stock market, thereby being restricted to portfolio investment in listed stocks except under limited circumstances.
However, the financial crisis changed the mindset of both the government officials and controlling shareholders of corporations. The financial crisis in Korea was not only triggered by a number of insolvent firms with massive amounts of non-performing loans, but was also the cause that resulted in a large number of additional insolvent firms, who under financial distress desperately needed outside liquidity in order to survive. 2 The most important task in the Korean economy was to effectively restructure these insolvent firms. In doing so, (especially crossborder) M&As has been emphasized as one of the most efficient ways in restructuring insolvent firms in a market-driven way by many economists and government officials. Moreover, the so-called 'obligatory tender offer rule' also discouraged M&A activity among domestic firms. Under the obligatory tender offer rule, a bidding firm seeking to acquire 25% or more of the outstanding shares of a listed company was required to purchase more than 50% of the shares in total through a tender offer and the difference between the amount already acquired and '50% + 1' had to be acquired at the highest price in the past 12 months. This system of obligatory tender offer system made it virtually impossible to actively pursue M&A transactions in Korea.
These restrictive regulations on M&A activities began to be eased soon after the financial crisis in 1997. At the end of 1997, the total acquisition requirement under the obligatory tender offer system was lowered to '40% + 1' before being finally abolished in February 1998. 3 The approval requirement from MOFE in case of friendly M&As by foreign investors targeting companies whose assets exceeded 2 trillion won was also abolished at the time. Other deregulatory policies to promote M&A activity in Korea were also implemented. For example, in May 1998, the limit on foreign investment of listed companies in the Korea Stock Exchange and KOSDAQ was abolished.
More importantly, in February 1998, the Labor Standards Law, which was perceived to be the biggest stumbling block to M&A activity in Korea, was overhauled to allow firms under financial difficulties involved in M&A transactions to dismiss employees. 4 This change was obviously designed to allow the acquirer an opportunity to restructure the company in order to 
III. Data Description
Before proceeding to the empirical analyses in this paper, some detail on the data set will be explained in this section. In doing so, we will see how the actual overall M&A trend in Korea has changed before and after the financial crisis, from which we can infer the effects of the policy changes on the Korean M&A market described in the previous section.
The data employed in this paper comes from two different sources. First, the data on It is perhaps worthwhile to examine how the actual trend of these transactions has changed over time to see the effect from the changes in the M&A policy described in Section II.
The numbers of transactions for each business combination are shown in Table 2 Table 2 shows that the M&A activity in Korea increases over time, especially following the financial crisis Although the main reason behind the KFTC's requirement for filing a report on such transactions is to prevent anti-competitive business combinations, this is a unique data set that keeps track of M&A activities in Korea, to our knowledge. Part of these reports was obtained from KFTC with the list of the company names involved (both acquired and acquiring firms) and the related dates of the transactions (dates for both application and approval). 7 Among these business combinations, we included the first three cases (acquisition of another company's share, mergers with another company and taking-overs of another company's business line) in our sample as the relevant M&A activities for our analysis. In addition, the data obtained from KFTC covers the time period between 1998-2001 only. Thus, the shaded area in Table 2 7 The transaction volume is one of the variables included in the data set but unfortunately we could not utilize this information in the paper because there were too many missing values.
indicates the available M&A data set used in our empirical analysis in Section IV.
Obtaining a list only containing the names and dates of M&A transactions are not useful for economic analysis. Thus we needed to obtain a second data set containing other corporate financial information before and after the M&A transactions. This financial information was obtained from NICE (National Information and Credit Evaluation, Inc.) Database. In Korea, firms subject to an external audit 8 have to report a yearly financial statement to the Financial Supervisory Service. The financial information is then collected by NICE where the integrity of the data is confirmed for publishing. Utilizing this NICE Database, we selected and constructed the relevant financial variables to be used in this paper.
9 Note: Numbers in parentheses are the ratio compared to total in each year and numbers in brackets are the growth rate compared to the previous year, both in percentage. The shaded area indicates the available data set we obtained from the KFTC. In this section, we would like to empirically assess the role of M&A transactions in restructuring Korea's distressed firms. To do so, three empirical exercises were conducted in the following subsections. For illustrative purposes, we divide our data set into four categories: firms which are 'insolvent and M&A-targeted' (group A), 'insolvent but not-M&A-targeted' (group B), 'solvent and M&A-targeted' (group C) and 'solvent and not-M&A-targeted' (group D). The sample for the first empirical exercise consists of only insolvent firms (that is, group A and group B) and we try to determine the differences in financial characteristics between these two groups. More specifically, we would like to investigate which insolvent firms are more likely to be the target of M&A transactions. By examining this, we can identify the factors behind M&A transaction targeting insolvent firms and the nature of the M&A market for insolvent firms in Korea.
The next exercise is to assess the consequences of M&A transactions targeting insolvent firms. Thus, the sample in this case is only group A and we directly compare the changes in performance of group A before and after the incident of M&A transactions. The last empirical exercise takes all four groups in the sample to obtain more general assessment on the role of M&A by asking if being the target of an M&A (regardless of its purpose) reduced the probability of becoming financially distressed in the subsequent year.
Before proceeding further, we have to determine the definitions for 'financially distressed' or 'insolvent' in our empirical analysis. Establishing the definition is critical since it will change the relevant sample firms of our analysis. The most natural (and strongest) definition for financially distressed firms is to include only those that went bankrupt at any given year.
However, this definition of financial distress would place too many limitations on our empirical analysis by substantially reducing the size of the sample. For example, among the firms that went bankrupt in 1999, there were only six cases in which bankrupted firms were involved in any M&A transaction. In this situation, performing a case study might be a more plausible research strategy than carrying out an econometric analysis. More importantly, whether a firm actually went bankrupt is not that relevant for the purpose of this paper. Rather, firms with severe financial difficulties (with high risk of going bankrupt) are the main focus of our empirical analysis.
In this respect, we adopt a rather simple definition for "financially distressed firm" in this paper. A firm is defined to be financially distressed at year t if the firm's interest coverage ratio (ICR, hereafter) is less than one for the previous three consecutive years (i.e., in years t, t-1 and
t-2), where ICR is calculated by (EBIT / interest expense) where EBIT represents Earnings
Before Interest and Tax. ICR is widely used as a ratio to analyze a firm's profitability and to indicate the firm's ability to service its debt. If a firm's ICR is less than one, that means that the firm is not able to even cover its interest expenses with its earnings. In a sense, this definition of financial distress allows us to include firms with the potential risk of going bankrupt even if it is not realized. 10 Having established a definition for financially distressed firms, we now turn to the empirical exercises conducted in this paper. 11
Causes of M&A of Financially Distressed Firms
The objective of this subsection is to determine which financially distressed firms are more likely to be the targets of an M&A transaction. There are vast quantities of empirical literature on this area, which attempt to verify the characteristics that determine the motivating factors behind M&A transactions. For example, Hasbrouck (1985) used data for 86 U.S. firms between 1976-1981 covering q-ratio, firm size, total debt-to-equity ratio and liquidity. He found that larger firms and firms with higher q ratios appear to be less likely to be the targets of a takeover.
There also have been a few attempts to identify the characteristics of M&A target firms in Korea. Lim and Lim (1994) applied a sample for 83 firms that merged between 1988 and 1994. This study found that a firm is more likely to be the target if a firm exhibited a low return on total assets, high leverage ratio and high ratio of liquid assets.
In this paper, our main focus differs from the previous literatures in the sense that our sample consists only of financially distressed firms while the empirical framework is the same as those of other literatures. The empirical framework for this exercise is the logit model, which is given by
where ϕ is logistic c.d.f. and 1 − t X is the vector of various financial characteristics of firms 10 Another way to define firm's financially distress might be to run a logit model for bankruptcy prediction and to use the predicted probability value as the firm's level of financial difficulty (or the probability of going bankrupt). But even in this case, we have to determine the cutoff level of the probability above which the financially distressed firms are defined. 11 In this paper, we will identify "financially distressed firm" defined in the way described above and "insolvent firm" interchangeably.
at year t-1. In choosing the financial variables that affect the probability of being the target of an M&A transaction, we considered a list of variables that previous empirical literatures identified as being significant in studying M&A activity. The explanatory variables included in this paper are as follows: LN (ASSET): natural logarithm of firm's total asset which controls the size effect of M&A transactions ICR: interest coverage ratio defined by EBIT / interest expense CUR: current ratio defined by current asset to current liability which measures the level of short-term liquidity available to a firm DAR: debt-to-asset ratio defined by total liability to total asset which indicates the leverage level and the long-run solvency of a firm.
OIA: ordinary income to total assets which measures the profitability of a firm ATR: total asset turnover ratio defined by sales to total asset which indicate how efficiently the firm is managing all of its assets to generate sales The results of this logit estimation are shown in column (i) and (ii) of Table 3 . In both specifications, we first find that the larger the firm's size, the more likely the firm will become the target of an M&A. The results are somewhat different result from those of previous empirical literatures studying firms in U.S. in which smaller firms were more likely to be the targets of an M&A. The discrepancy may be due to the fact that the M&A market in Korea is not well developed and that most of the M&As in Korea are friendly not hostile.
12 This explanation could be supported when we compare specification (i) and (ii) where the differences are the inclusion of dummy variables for Chaebol-affiliated M&A targets. Notice that all the estimated coefficients on these dummy variables are positive and significant at a 1% level and that the magnitude of the size effect decreased by half (from 0.492 to 0.257) when we include these Chaebol dummies. This implies that M&A activities among Chaebol-affiliated firms play a significant role in Korea.
Next, ICR is not significantly different from zero in both specifications. Note that all firms in these regressions are insolvent in the sense that ICR is less than one in the previous three consecutive years. Although the level of ICR varies across firms, this information appears not to be significant in the regressions.
Next, current ratio (CUR), which represents the short-term liquidity of a firm, would increase the probability of insolvent firms of being M&A targets (at 5% level) while debt-toasset ratio (DAR), which represents the long-run solvency of a firm, is not different from zero at any conventional significance level. This implies that once a firm is characterized as being financially distressed, the long-term financial structure is not an important factor for becoming an M&A target and rather short-term solvency is more important. 13 Finally, we have two explanatory variables that represent a firm's profitability or efficiency: OIA (operating income to total asset ratio) and ATR (asset turnover ratio). The estimated coefficients of both variables have minus signs and are statistically significant (except OIA in specification (ii)). This means that more profitable and more efficient firms are less likely to be the targets of M&A.
In sum, in the M&A market for insolvent firms, a firm with higher liquidity, lower profitability and lower efficiency is more likely to be the target of an M&A transaction. These results are consistent with the previous literature. However, the larger the firm's size, the higher the probability of becoming an M&A target and the firm's long term capital structure (measured by debt-to-equity ratio) is not an important determinant for being an M&A target. Together with the significant coefficients on Chaebol dummies, this may imply that the M&A market in Korea is not working efficiently in the sense that there may be some factors other than economic reasons driving M&A transactions in Korea.
Finally, in order to see if these results also hold for solvent firms' M&A market, we run the same logit regression with the sample of solvent firms (i.e., group C and D as mentioned at the beginning of this section), which is shown in columns (iii) and (iv) in Table 3 . Most of the results are the same as in the case of the insolvent firms including significant firm size and
Chaebol-affiliated firm effects. Firm profitability and efficiency also fall in the same direction as before. More profitable and efficient firms are less likely to be the target of M&A transactions. 13 Another interpretation between liquidity and the probability of being the M&A target appears in Dietrich and Sorenson (1984) . They interpreted high current ratio as excessive liquidity due to inefficient asset allocation. According to this interpretation, higher current ratio liquidity implies lower efficiency of a firm and thus increases the probability of being the target of an M&A. Note: Dependent variables are 1 if the firm is the target of M&A transaction at year t and 0 otherwise. Unreported year dummies and industry dummies (at one-digit level) are included in all estimations. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
The differences appear in the variables of CUR and DAR. In this instance, short-term liquidity (CUR) no longer plays a factor. Instead, long-run solvency is a more important determinant: the higher the debt-to-asset ratio, the higher the probability of being an M&A target. Even in the M&A market for solvent firms, a firm with less additional capacity of borrowings is being acquired. 14 Again, considering the size effects and Chaebol dummy effects together, the M&A market in Korea for solvent firms seems to be working inefficiently as well and Chaebael seems to play major role in the Korean M&A market.
In this subsection, we tried to identify the financial characteristics of M&A targets among insolvent firms to determine the nature of the M&A market in the aftermath of the financial crisis. In addition, we compared the results with those of solvent firms' M&A market. It seems that the M&A market in Korea (both for solvent and insolvent firms) still remains inefficient in the sense that other factors than economic motives are larger factors in driving M&A activities.
Changes in Performance of Acquired Firms Pre-and Post-M&A transactions
Whether the performance of M&A-involved firms improved after the transactions is an important empirical question. Recognizing this importance, there exists a long list of empirical studies in this field as well. Most of the studies on this issue, however, analyzed the acquiring firm's improvement in performance, especially focusing on the reaction of the stock market around the day the M&A was announced. 15 The underlying conclusions of these studies are that targeted firm's stockholders benefit from mergers (because of the premium received from selling their shares) while bidding firms generally breakeven, which increases the combined equity value of the bidding and targeted firms as a result of the takeover. 16 Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) took a different approach on this issue and used postmerger accounting data to test directly for changes in operating performance as a result of mergers. They examined the post-acquisition performance of the largest U.S. mergers completed between 1979 and mid-1984 using operating cash flows deflated by assets as a performance benchmark. The study found significant improvements in post-acquisition performance.
However, Rawvenscraft and Scherer (1987) analyzed 95 cases of tender offers and found declining profitability among acquired enterprises following a takeover. More recently, Bae, Kang and Kim (2002) analyzed the abnormal stock returns of the acquiring firms in Korea. The study found evidence of tunneling effects among Chaebol-affiliated firm involved in M&A 14 This result of significantly positive coefficient estimates on DAR is also found in the previous literature such as in Lim and Lim (1994) which analyzed M&A cases in Korea between 1988 Korea between -1994 Studies of this sort include, Bradley and Jarrell (1988) , Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) , Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandecker (1992) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) to name just a few. 16 See Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) . activity in the sense that while minority shareholders of the bidding Chaebol-affiliated firm lose, the controlling shareholders of that firm gain by enhancing the value of other firms in the same Chaebol group.
In this subsection, we assess whether the performance of financially distressed firms has improved following the M&A transaction in order to examine if such M&A transactions played any role in restructuring the distressed firms. Thus our empirical analysis focuses on an acquired firm's performance before and after M&A activity.
Under this framework, we have two problems in sampling relevant firms for our analysis. 
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Keeping these empirical problems in mind, we choose three financial variables as performance benchmarks for M&A targeted firms, following Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) .
They are OIA (Operating Income to Total Asset), OIS (Ordinary Income to Sales Ratio) and STA (Sales to Asset Ratio). 19 These variables could be affected by economy wide or industryspecific shocks and therefore it is not meaningful to compare the absolute values of these variables. Thus, for each variable, we calculated the industry average (at two digit level of 17 In principle, the longest time period that could be analyzed is four years (since the available NICE data is covered until 2002, for the M&A cases in 1998 the longest time period following the M&A is four years.). But there are too many missing values so in practice the longest time period in our analysis would be two years after the transactions. 18 In Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) , the time period of the analysis is longer than ours: five years before and after M&A activity. However in their empirical findings, effects of M&A are highest in the second year and diminishe afterwards. 19 Note that these three variables are inter-related in the following way. OIA = OIS x STA. In other words, the first term OIA indicates overall profitability of a firm, which could be broken down into two parts. One is OIS which indicates a firm's sales margin and the other is STA (asset turnover ratio) which represents a firm's activity or efficiency in its business line.
KSIC) for each year and subtracted this industry average from each firm's value in order to eliminate economy wide and industry-specific shock. Table 4 shows the mean values of each industry-adjusted variable before and after M&A transactions, the mean-difference between the two time periods and its t-statistics. Panel A compares change in performance between year -1 and in year +l around the year M&A was completed. The results show that only the change in OIS is statistically significant among all three variables, although increases in the mean values are observed for all variables. Note: All performance variables were industry-adjusted before calculating mean values. *, ** and *** on t-values represent that we can reject the null hypothesis that mean-difference is zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
However, when we consider one more year in the time period, the results change significantly. Panel B compares the mean values of the performance variables for the averaged two-year period before and after the M&A transactions. In all cases, the mean values have increased (although the minus signs of mean values indicate that they are under-performing compared to their peer companies in the same industry) and the mean-difference test reveal that the improvements in performance of firms are statistically significant. Panel C compares performance change in performance between year -1 and in year +2. We can see that the same conclusion could be made as for Panel B. The inferences we could draw from these results are that M&A activities in Korea, in fact, have improved performance of financially distressed target firms and that these effects are pronounced over longer time period. Note: All performance variables were industry-adjusted before calculating mean values. *, ** and *** on t-values represent that we can reject the null hypothesis that mean-difference is zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.. From the empirical exercises in this subsection, it seems that the overall improvement in performance exists in both the cases of solvent and insolvent M&A targeted firms. But for M&A transactions involving insolvent targeted firms, the improvement in performance is more significant and robust.
Have M&A Transactions Reduced the Probability of Being Financially Distressed?
In this subsection, we would like to make a more general assessment on the role of M&A by asking if being an M&A target (regardless of its motives) has reduced the probability of targeted firms becoming financially distressed in the subsequent year. In this regards, all four groups (group A, B, C and D) are included in the sample for this exercise as explained at the beginning of this section. Previous theoretical and empirical literatures explain that the motives of M&A activity could be to capture the synergistic effects for both the acquired and the acquiring firms, to efficiently reallocate available resources between two merging parties or to rehabilitate financially distressed but viable targeted firms in order to improve its economic value.
Thus, regardless of the motivation, the success of an M&A activity could be indirectly evaluated on the basis of whether the firm becomes financially distressed following the M&A. This is the approach in making our assessment in this subsection. The empirical framework for this exercise is similar to the first exercise. We adopted the typical bankruptcy prediction model but with the previous M&A dummy included in the explanatory variables. were commonly adopted in the previous literature. They are:
CAB: current assets to total borrowings ratio 21 CFL: operating cash flow to total liabilities ratio STL: sales to total liabilities ratio BAR: total borrowings to total asset ratio IEB: interest expenses to total borrowings ratio OAT: operating asset turnover ratio (sales / operating assets) MNA: dummy variable which takes value 1 if a firm were a target of M&A at year t-
The results of the logit estimation are shown in Table 4 . The regression results on the financial characteristics are consistent with empirical works for bankruptcy prediction in Korea such as those of Kang et al. (2000) . In the full specification in column (iii), the estimated coefficients on CFL (representing firm profitability) and STL (representing firm's efficiency) are negatively significant. That implies that more profitable and efficient firms are less likely to become insolvent. Additionally, the coefficients on BAR (representing firm's dependency on outside borrowings compared to its asset) is estimated to be positive and significant, implying that the more dependent a firm is on outside borrowing, the higher the risk of becoming insolvent in the future.
In this regression, the M&A dummy variable (MNA) is the one of our main interests.
Except the simplest specification of column (i), the estimated coefficients on M&A dummies are negative and significant at 10% level. The negative sign on this coefficient implies that if a firm was the target of an M&A activity, the probability of becoming financially distressed in the subsequent year would decrease. Although this result may not be direct evidence of positive effects of M&A transactions on financially distressed firms, we might be able to infer that overall M&A activity could reduce the risk of becoming insolvent at least in the short run. 20 Including M&A dummy in this way could raise the simultaneity problem in the regression since an M&A could be initiated because the firm is already financially distressed. This problem was attenuated, albeit not completely disappeared, by taking one year's time lag for M&A dummy variable. 21 Total borrowings include short-term borrowings from banking institutions, current maturities of longterm borrowings, bonds payable and long-term borrowings from banking institutions. Note: Dependent variables is 1 if the firm's interest coverage ratio is below 1 for the previous three years and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
In this paper, we reviewed the major policy changes in the deregulation of M&A activities around the financial crisis in order to facilitate corporate restructuring, observing a substantial increase in the overall trend of M&A activity. And the empirical exercises conducted in the previous section reveal that there exists some evidence that M&A activities targeting financially distressed firms in Korea had positive effects on the profitability and efficiency of the targeted company.
Some limitations on our empirical analyses and other issues that should be accounted for in future researches should be outlined. First, as was mentioned in the empirical part of this paper, the time period of our analysis is too short to appropriately assess the long-run consequences of the M&A activity. Although our analysis may be meaningful in analyzing short-run effects within one or two years following the transactions, it is commonly believed that the real economic gains of an M&A will emerge over the long run.
Second, the empirical study in this paper mainly focused on the targeted firms while excluding the other party of the M&A transactions, i.e., the acquiring firms. This was because the main objective of this paper was to see how the financial characteristics of the acquired firms have changed during the process of corporate restructuring. However, one of the objectives for both acquired and acquiring firms undertaking an M&A transactions is to capture the synergetic effects (even in the case of M&A for restructuring). In this respect, analyzing both acquired and acquiring firms would provide more complete understanding on the effects of M&A activities in corporate restructuring.
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The final and equally as important issue for future research endeavors is an industrial analysis of M&A activities. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) studied industry-level patterns in takeovers and restructuring activity during 1982-1989 period using U.S. data. The study found significant differences in both the rate and time-series clustering of these activities. This industrial analysis might shed some lights on Korea's case in the relationship between industrial shocks and M&A activities. For example, it would be interesting to see if the degree of 22 As was described in Section II, one of the reasons leading the Korean government to deregulate M&A policies after the financial crisis was to attract cross-border M&A (including green field FDI) from foreign investors. In this sense, it would also be interesting to see if the causes and the consequences are different between domestic M&A and cross-border M&A transactions. This aspect could not be included in our analyses of this paper because the KFTC data did not contain the information on the nationality of the acquiring party.
industrial shocks and industrial M&A activities are correlated, among which industries do M&A activities have the most positive/negative outcomes and which industrial characteristics attract cross-border/domestic M&A activities.
Keeping in mind the limitations and possible extensions of our empirical analysis, we conclude this paper with some policy recommendations. As explained above, our empirical analyses revealed that some evidence showing M&A activity having a positive impact on corporate restructuring. The immediate policy implication of this result would be to further deregulate government policies to promote M&A activities. However, as we have seen in Section II, most of the regulatory restrictions on (both domestic and cross-border) M&A activities have been removed in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Therefore, in Korea the remaining agenda for policy makers would not be regulatory issues. Rather, government policy should be focused on institutional issues such as financial infrastructure and labor market reform that could directly and indirectly support M&A activities.
First, in order to promote M&A activities (both for restructuring and for other motives),
constructing an efficient financial infrastructure is a necessary pre-condition. For example, financial institutions specializing in M&A-related investment banking will reduce the transaction costs in identifying and valuating M&A targets. In Korea, securities firms depend mainly on brokerage fees for revenues, consequently, little or no financial services comparable to those offered by foreign investment banks are available. The first empirical exercise in this paper shows that the Korean M&A market seems to remain inefficient and Chaebol plays a significant role in it. In order to enhance the efficiency of the M&A market and to promote small-scaled M&A transactions in Korea, constructing well-functioning financial infrastructure which could intermediate M&A deals more efficiently would be indispensable.
Secondly, in most cases a successful corporate restructuring following an M&A transactions would involve reallocating the resources of the acquired firm including labor forces.
Recognizing this, the Korean government amended the Labor Standards Law in 1998 in order to allow firms involved in M&A transactions for restructuring purposes to lay off workers, as described in Section II. However, the enforcement of this amended provision remains uncertain due to strong resistance from the acquired firm's labor union. The most recent example might be the merger of Chohung Bank by Shinhan Financial Group. In the wake of an all-out strike by
Chohung labor union which feared about massive lay-offs of its employees, the two merging parties came to an agreement that the jobs of Chojung workers would be secured for one year after the merger. Although discussing this issue in more detail is beyond the scope of this paper, the government has to find an effective way to reform the rigid labor market in Korea, because in this situation M&A could not be an attractive way to reconstruct financially distressed firms from the viewpoint of the acquiring companies.
Third, the level of transparency with regard to information and accounting of corporations needs to be further improved. Without transparency, the acquiring companies, in searching for potential target firms, would face too much uncertainty on the valuation of the target firms. In fact, one of the major concerns of foreign investors with respect to the acquisition of Korean assets centered on the valuation of non-performing loans that might be window-dressed in a certain way (Mody and Negishi (2001) ). In order to attract more domestic and cross-border M&A in Korea, the fair practice in accounting and the increased transparency would be one of the most important tasks for the policy makers.
